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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Article VIII § 2 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3) (j) (1987 & Supp. 1990) and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in ruling that summary 
judgment was appropriate in this case since plaintiff could not 
prove actual loss of income and earning capacity pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 (1986 & Supp. 1990) 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court accords no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions in granting a 
motion for summary judgment, but reviews them for correctness. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 246 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 (1986)(amended 1989 & 1990) 
in part provides: 
(1) Personal injury protection coverages 
and benefits include: 
. • « . 
(b)(i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any 
loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity per 
person from inability to work, for a maximum of 52 
consecutive weeks after the loss, except that this 
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benefit need not be paid for the first three days of 
disability, unless the disability continues for longer 
than two consecutive weeks after the date of injury; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case, 
This is an appeal from the trial court's ruling that 
plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for loss of income and 
earning capacity under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307, where the 
stipulated facts evidenced that Plaintiff lost no income or 
earning capacity. 
B. Course and Disposition of Proceedings Below. 
Plaintiff filed suit against her insured, defendant 
Guaranty, to recover PIP benefits for loss of income and earning 
capacity, which benefits were refused. On cross motions for 
summary judgment the trial court ruled that plaintiff was not 
entitled to benefits under the applicable statute since under the 
stipulated facts she could not demonstrate both loss of gross 
income and loss of earning capacity. 
C. Statement of Relevant Undisputed Facts. 
1. On the evening of February 1, 1989, the plaintiff, 
Glenda Versluis, was in an automobile accident at 2500 South and 
4000 West, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 21-22). 
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2. The defendant, Guaranty National Insurance Company 
("Guaranty"), was plaintiff's no-fault insurance carrier. (R. 
41). 
3. The day following the accident, plaintiff was 
examined by Dr. Joseph Valley. (R. 21). 
4. On plaintiff's second visit to Dr. Valley, x-rays 
were taken which showed no sign of injury. Dr. Valley, however, 
gave plaintiff a prescription for pain. (R. 21). 
5. At the end of February 1989, plaintiff saw her own 
doctor, Dr. Dan Henry, who prescribed exercises. (R. 21). 
6. Plaintiff also saw a chiropractor in February, 
1989, because neither the prescriptions nor the physical therapy 
prescribed by the physicians seemed to help. The chiropractor, 
Dr. Jim Van Slooten, did not advise plaintiff not to work. (R. 
21) . 
7. Neither Dr. Henry nor Dr. Valley opined that the 
injury would be permanent. (R. 21). 
8. Dr. Henry allegedly told plaintiff not to work. 
However, no written evidence is available to support this 
allegation. And, Dr. Henry did not give plaintiff a disability 
or impairment rating. (R. 21). 
9. Dr. Nathaniel Nord and Dr. Gordon Kimball 
subsequently examined plaintiff. While both physicians 
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characterized plaintiff's concerns as soft tissue injuries, 
neither advised her not to work nor issued a disability or 
impairment rating. (R. 22). 
10. Plaintiff was employed by Service Incorporated 
from 1977 to 1979. Plaintiff quit this job in 1979 to have her 
first child. Plaintiff was employed by Litton Industries between 
1981 and 1983. She quit this job to take care of her child and 
because she did not get along with others at work and had a 
misunderstanding with her supervisor. Plaintiff was briefly 
employed by Central Valley Tire Inc. during 1985. (R. 22). 
11. Between December 1985 and April 1986, plaintiff 
was employed by John's Diesel. Plaintiff was employed by Cencor 
Temporary Services between June, 1986 and February, 1987. (R. 
22). 
12. Plaintiff received unemployment benefits between 
March and May of 1987. Beginning in the summer of 1987, 
plaintiff began receiving welfare assistance which continued 
through 1988, 1989, and at least until the day of plaintiff's 
deposition on March 16, 1990. (R. 22-23). 
13. Plaintiff had been unemployed for thirteen months 
prior to the accident in question. (R. 42). 
14. Plaintiff did not look for work in 1988 and only 
looked for work during January of 1989. (R. 42). 
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15. Plaintiff worked at the Utah Auto Auction for two 
days in early 1989. (R. 23). 
16. On February 15, 1990, plaintiff filed suit 
against her insured, defendant Guaranty, to recover PIP benefits 
for loss of income and earning capacity allegedly resulting from 
the accident. (R. 3). 
17. The parties filed cross motions for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 18, 34). 
18. In both her Memorandum in Support of her Motion 
for Summary Judgment and in her Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff failed to cite 
the trial court to any evidence, or even any reference in the 
record, supporting the allegation in her complaint that she had 
suffered loss of gross income and earning capacity as a result of 
the accident. (R. 35, 47). 
19. On July 17, 1990, the Third Judicial District 
Court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, entered summary 
judgment in favor of defendant Guaranty, concluding in part that: 
1. Plaintiff was not employed at the time 
of the accident. 
2. Plaintiff had not been employed for a period of 
thirteen months before the accident. 
3. Plaintiff presented no provable evidence that she 
had eminent employment, including the following: 
a. No evidence of a job offer; and 
b. No evidence of hours that she would work; and 
c. No evidence of wages that she would be 
receiving while working; and 
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d. No detailed specific evidence that she was 
seeking employment. 
4. The Court concluded as a matter of law that 
pursuant to the statute 31A-22-307, U.C.A., that [sic] 
plaintiff must prove actual lost wages and loss of 
earning capacity, The court further found that the two 
prong requirement of the statute had not been met by 
the plaintiff. The court did acknowledge that 
plaintiff had submitted tax records and income records 
for periods in her life when she was working, but that 
none of the income periods included any time within the 
thirteen months before the accident. 
(R. 55 Attached as Exhibit "A"). Importantly, Plaintiff 
stipulated to the above factual statements of the court, which 
determination by the court compelled the conclusion that 
Plaintiff could not prove loss of income and earning capacity. 
20. Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal on August 15, 
1990. (R. 58). 
21. On appeal, plaintiff has not disputed the trial 
court's explicit conclusions and factual statements plaintiff 
stipulated to below regarding plaintiff's lack of evidence on the 
issue of loss of income and earning capacity. (C£.,R. 55 
with Appellant's brief at P. 2.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled that summary judgment 
was proper since plaintiff could not demonstrate actual loss of 
gross income and earning capacity as required to recover benefits 
under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 (1986 & Supp. 1990). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE IN THIS 
CASE SINCE THE FACTS TO WHICH PLAINTIFF 
STIPULATED EVIDENCED THAT PLAINTIFF 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS FOR RECOVERY. 
A. Assuming The Statutory Scheme Would Allow Recovery 
By Merely Showing A Loss Of Earning Capacity, 
Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Given The 
Stipulated Facts In This Casei 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes 
that summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing relevant 
pleadings, depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories 
and other documents, the court determines there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving part is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. See generally, Horaan v. Industrial 
Design Corporation, 657 P. 2d 751 (Utah 1982) (existence of 
genuine issue of fact does not preclude summary judgment if 
issues are immaterial to resolution of case); Aird Insurance 
Agency v. Zions First National Bank, 612 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah 
1980) (motion for summary judgment permits excursion beyond 
pleadings; where facts irrefutably disproved facts pleaded 
summary judgment is appropriate); Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 
(Utah 1976) (court may look beyond motion for summary judgment in 
determining appropriateness thereof). 
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In the case below, plaintiff sought to recover benefits 
from Guaranty for loss of income and earning capacity she claimed 
to have allegedly sustained from an automobile accident. Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(1)(b)(i) (1986)(amended 1989 & 1990),x 
under which plaintiff sought to recover, explicitly provides: 
(1) Personal Injury Protection Coverages And 
Benefits Include: 
(b)(i) the lesser of $250 per week or 
85% of any loss of gross income and loss of earning 
capacity per person from an inability to work, for 
a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss. 
Also, Utah Code Ann. S31A-22-309(5) (Supp. 1990) outlines the 
procedure for the receipt of PIP benefits: 
Benefits for any period are overdue if they are 
not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives 
reasonable proof of the fact and amount of 
expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable 
proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the 
amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if 
not paid within 30 days after that proof is 
received by the insurer. 
(Emphasis added). Applying the standard for summary judgment 
noted above, the trial court analyzed this statutory scheme and 
granted Guaranty summary judgment after correctly concluding that 
plaintiff's claim failed since, under the facts to which she 
1
 Subsequent amendments to this statutory chapter & section 
have not changed the language or analysis of the relevant 
provision. 
8 
stipulated, she could not demonstrate reasonable proof that she 
had suffered both loss of gross income and loss of earning 
capacity as required by statute. 
The trial court's conclusion is supported by the facts 
stipulated to by the Appellant below, the plain language of the 
statute, the history and intent underlying the same and sound 
legal reasoning and policy; and the trial court's order should 
accordingly be affirmed on appeal. 
Plaintiff's primary argument on appeal is that the trial 
court incorrectly ruled that summary judgment was proper since 
plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that she had suffered both a 
loss of gross income and a loss of earning capacity as required 
for recovery of PIP benefits under Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307. 
Plaintiff claims that she was only required to demonstrate a loss 
of earning capacity in order to recover thereunder. Although, as 
discussed below, the subject legislation requires a showing of 
both loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity for 
recovery of such benefits, even under plaintiff's construction of 
the statutory scheme, her action fails given the facts to which 
she stipulated. 
In this regard, while this Court has not heretofore 
addressed the specific claim raised by the plaintiff, it has, by 
analogy, previously considered the degree of proof necessary to 
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demonstrate loss of earning capacity. Indeed, in Nelson v. 
Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah, 1982), this Court considered a 
negligence action, analogous to that at hand, arising out of an 
automobile collision where the defendant had asserted that the 
trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could award 
the plaintiff damages for the loss of future earnings. Therein, 
the trial court had instructed the jury that the plaintiff would 
be entitled to an award for the present value of loss of future 
earnings if the jury believed from a preponderance of the 
evidence that he was reasonably certain to suffer such loss in 
the future. In responding to defendant's motion for a new trial 
on the basis that the plaintiff had provided no evidence that he 
would sustain loss of future earnings as a result of his injury, 
the trial court had ruled: 
The defense attorney is correct in that there was 
no direct evidence of dollar anticipated loss in 
the future. However, plaintiff's appearance is now 
abnormal. There is evidence from his mother, and 
from himself, that indicates that it has definitely 
affected his personality. That such an event would 
occur without affecting the general lifetime 
expected earnings of an individual would be 
unlikely. While it is possible that the plaintiff 
will find some type of endeavor that he can pursue 
which will return to him the same general earnings 
that he would have had had he not suffered the 
injury, the court believes that the jury could well 
consider that this is extremely unlikely. 
Plaintiff is a college student who was injured when 
he was 19 years of age. He is now majoring in 
business-type classes. The jury could easily 
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conclude that his potential as an earner has been 
substantially reduced. 
Id. at 735 
In addressing the issue on appeal, this Court held that 
the trial court had erred in instructing the jury on the issue 
since the plaintiff could point to no evidence upon which the 
jury could realistically assess damages for future loss of 
earnings and the jury had no basis, except pure guesswork, for 
estimating earnings reasonably certain to be lost in the future. 
Id. at 735 (citations omitted). In short, there was no evidence 
upon which the jury could reasonably base such an award. 
As analogous to the case at hand, Nelson accurately sets 
forth the rule that reasonable and sufficient proof or evidence 
is required of a non-speculative nature before the issue of 
earnings reasonably certain to be lost in the future ("earning 
capacity") can be submitted to the jury. This holding comports 
with this Court's long standing recognition of the principle that 
a trier of fact "should not be allowed to assess future damages 
on probability, but only such damages as it believes from the 
preponderance of the evidence the plaintiff will with reasonable 
certainty incur in the future." See Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 
Utah 2d. 261, 409 P.2d 121, 125 (1965) (emphasis in original; 
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footnote omitted). Damages cannot be based upon speculation, 
guesswork or conjecture. 
Other courts have focused upon the degree of proof 
necessary in order to establish entitlement to disability 
benefits for loss of earning capacity. As the Kansas Supreme 
Court of Appeals noted in a case analyzing the issue of whether 
an unemployed person with no past employment history and no firm 
offer of future employment is entitled to disability benefits: 
[T]remendous proof problems exist regarding the 
amount of anticipated future earnings, where there 
is no past employment record to review nor any bona 
fide offer of future employment to consider. 
Undoubtedly, some persons without prior working 
experience and otherwise qualified might be able to 
adequately demonstrate entitlement to disability 
benefits. Such unemployed persons might include a 
college student who anticipates employment after 
the school term, a person engaged in a job 
training program with placement opportunities, or a 
person possessing special skills or education in 
high demand in the job market at the relevant time. 
• * * 
In summary, the plaintiff in this action would be 
required to prove the following to establish 
entitlement to disability payments: 
1. That she was unable to engage in available 
and appropriate gainful employment by showing (a) 
the nature and extent of her injuries; (b) her 
injury was the cause of her inability to work; (c) 
potential employment was accessible, obtainable and 
commensurate with her skills, educational 
background, work experience and any other relevant 
employment criteria. 
2. That the time at which she would become 
regularly employed would be within one year after 
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becoming unable to work as a result of her 
injuries. 
3. Since she is unable to show an actual offer 
of employment, that she possess something more than 
a mere hope or wish that employment will be 
forthcoming, i.e., her efforts to gain employment 
must reflect diligent attempts and a serious 
intention to join the work force which persuades 
the trier of fact that regular employment is a 
reasonable expectation. 
4. A reasonable basis to calculate anticipate 
future earnings must be provided, eg., the 
prevailing wage and the particular employment field 
being pursued, the minimum wage, etc. 
See, Morgan v State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 613 P.2d 684, 689 
(Kansas Ct. App. 1980). Having failed to meet such a showing, the 
Kansas Court upheld the trial court's conclusion that the 
plaintiff could not recover for disability benefits for loss of 
future earnings, or in other words, loss of earning capacity. 
In striking comparison to facts in the Nelson case 
previously decided by this Court and the facts determined by the 
Kansas Court of Appeals in Morgan as justifying the conclusion 
that loss of earning capacity could not be proven, the facts 
noted by the trial court below, to which plaintiff stipulated, 
likewise demonstrate that plaintiff in this case failed to 
reference any reasonable, non-speculative proof that she had 
actually lost her capacity to earn. Indeed, plaintiff stipulated 
that she had no evidence of a job offer, no evidence of hours she 
worked, no evidence of wages she would be receiving while 
working, and no specific evidence that she was seeking employment 
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at the time she sought the claimed disability benefits for loss 
of earning capacity. Further, plaintiff did not dispute the 
facts raised in defendant's summary judgment motion that 
plaintiff's doctors gave no disability or impairment ratings, nor 
in most if not all instances, even opined that the injury would 
be permanent or affect plaintiff's capacity to work. And, in 
comparison to criteria stressed in Morgan, plaintiff likewise 
failed to demonstrate the existence of facts to show (1) the 
nature and extent of her injuries; (2) that her injuries were the 
cause of her inability to work; (3) that potential employment was 
accessible given her background and work experience; (4) that 
absent the injury she would have been regularly employed; (5) 
that she had something more than a wish for employment and (6) 
that she exhibited diligent attempts and an intention to join 
the work force. See id. Instead, the facts to which plaintiff 
stipulated and her employment history, including the undisputed 
fact that she had been unemployed for 13 months prior to the 
accident in question compelled the trial court's conclusion that, 
as in Nelson, there was no basis, except pure guesswork, 
speculation or conjecture for plaintiff to claim loss of earning 
capacity. See Nelson, 657 P.2d at 735. 
Accordingly, even assuming that the legislature intended 
that a claimant, such as plaintiff, could recover benefits under 
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Utah Code Ann. Sec. 31A-22-307(1)(b)(i) solely by showing loss of 
earning capacity without also demonstrating Actual loss of gross 
income, the trial court's conclusion granting summary judgment 
was appropriate in this case given the undisputed and stipulated 
facts that plaintiff was clearly unable to even demonstrate a 
loss of earning capacity resulting from her accident. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That 
Plaintiff Could Not Demonstrate Both The 
Statutory Requisites Of Loss Of Income 
And Earning Capacity to Recover Benefits 
Under Utah Law. 
In addition to claiming that she was entitled to benefits 
under Utah Code Ann §31A-22-307, merely by claiming an alleged 
loss of earning capacity as a result of the accident, plaintiff 
also urges on appeal that the trial court incorrectly ruled that 
her claim failed since she could not demonstrate that she had 
suffered both loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity 
as required by statute. 
As this Court has repeatedly held, a statute should be 
applied according to its literal wording unless it is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable; and it must be assumed that 
each term in a statute was used advisably by the legislature and 
that each should be interpreted and applied according to its 
usually accepted meaning and in harmony with the other provisions 
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within an Act since it is not the duty of the courts to assess 
the wisdom of a statutory scheme. See, West Jordan v. Morrison, 
656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). 
Applying these principles to the case at hand, a plain 
reading of the relevant statutes noted above required that the 
plaintiff in this case demonstrate reasonable proof of actual 
"loss of gross income" and, in addition to, "loss of earning 
capacity" before she could receive any benefits thereunder. In 
order to determine whether genuine facts existed as to the issue 
of plaintiff's potential recovery for loss of gross income and 
earning capacity, the court considered the above-noted facts 
plaintiff stipulated to at oral argument below, and concluded 
that, notwithstanding the fact plaintiff had plead that she had 
allegedly provided defendant reasonable proof of plaintiff's 
inability to work, summary judgment against the plaintiff was 
appropriate because according to plaintiff's own account and 
testimony: (1) she was not receiving any income at the time of 
her accident; (2) she had not been employed for at least 13 
months prior thereto; (3) she had not even substantially looked 
for work for approximately two years; and (4) she could not 
provide evidentiary support for the allegation that she was 
physically unable to work. (R. 21-22, 42). In short, she had 
suffered no loss of income. 
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Accordingly, inasmuch as a plain reading of the applicable 
statutes clearly require that plaintiff must provide reasonable 
proof of a loss of gross income in order to receive disability 
loss of income and loss of earning capacity benefits and since 
the facts stipulated to by plaintiff in this case clearly 
demonstrate that she could not meet this proof as there was no 
evidence that she was receiving any income at the time of the 
incident nor that she had been employed or even looked for work 
for over a year prior thereto, the trial court correctly ruled 
that plaintiff would not be entitled to the claimed benefits and 
summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. 
C. Summary Judgment Was Appropriate In This Case 
Since The Legislature Clearly Intended To Deny 
Benefits For Loss Of Earning Capacity When There 
Was No Reasonable Proof That Plaintiff Would Be 
Entitled To The Same. 
Finally, plaintiff's simple "mathematical computation" set 
forth in her appellate brief, while interestingly novel, in no 
way reflects the policy underlying Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-
307(1)(b)(i), application of which, in addition to the plain 
language of the subject legislation, compels the conclusion that 
the trial court correctly ruled below. Indeed, although 
plaintiff urges this court to read the word "and" as a 
"computational" term in the statutory phrase, "gross income and 
loss of earning capacity," the history of and intent underlying 
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the statute clearly demonstrates that the legislature carefully 
chose the term "gross income and loss of earning capacity" in 
order to avoid meritless claims by limiting recovery under the 
No-Fault Act only to cases where there is both a loss of gross 
income and a loss of earning capacity• 
In this regard, Utah Code Ann- § 31-41-2 (1973), although 
repealed in 1985, emphasizes the policy underlying Utah's No-
Fault Act. When the act was overhauled in 1985 specific 
procedures and details of the same were modified, but the 
substantial purpose underlying the legislation was not changed: 
The intention of the legislature is hereby to 
possibly stabilize, if not effectuate certain 
savings in, the rising costs of automobile 
accident insurance and to effectuate a more 
efficient, equitable method of handling the 
greater bulk of the personal injury claims that 
arise out of automobile accidents, these being 
those not involving great amounts of damages. 
(See Exhibit B). 
This Court has emphasized this essential policy in a case 
analogous to that at hand. In Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. 
Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977), the plaintiff had contended that a 
twelve-year-old boy was entitled to benefits under the household 
services provision of the no-fault act simply because, under a 
technical and imaginative reading of the statute, he was 
theoretically unable to perform minor household chores after 
being injured by an automobile while riding his bicycle. In 
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denying the plaintiff recovery, this Court stressed that the 
interpretation and application of law should not be a process of 
technical or computational application, but rather a process of 
considered rational reasoning. Accordingly: 
[t]he principle which best serves the objective 
to be desired is to give both parties the benefit 
of a sensible, even-handed and practical 
application of the statute, under the assumption 
that all of its language was used advisedly and in 
harmony with its purposes. If the Act had intended 
reimbursement for any and all duties performed by 
members of households, it could have been plainly 
so stated. But it does not do so. Only by keeping 
the awards within reason, and excepting therefrom 
claims that might be unrealistic, fanciful, or 
perhaps even fraudulent, can the stated objective, 
"to effectuate . . . savings in the rising costs of 
automobile accident insurance . . . " be 
accomplished. Otherwise it is obvious that 
necessary increases in premiums would defeat, 
rather than promote the purposes of the Act. 
Id. at 9 60 (footnotes omitted; emphasis and ellipsis in 
original). Thereafter, this Court applied the purpose of the no-
fault insurance act to the statute analogous to that at hand and 
concluded: 
[I]t becomes plain that the Act both in its 
statement of general purpose and its specific 
provisions, was not intended to provide an 
automatic reward or a "windfall," for being 
involved in an accident by requiring payment when 
there was no loss actually suffered, nor for any 
expense not reasonably to be incurred, but should 
be construed in conformity with the fundamental 
principle of insurance law, that the purpose of 
insurance is to indemnify for losses or damages 
suffered, as contrasted to gambling for a 
munificent reward if a loss occurs. 
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Id. at 960-961 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added); see also, 
Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609, 612 (Utah, 1979) 
(No-Fault Insurance Act was never intended to give injured 
plaintiff windfall or extra income as benefit for having had 
accident). 
In addition, commensurate with the standard in Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-309(5)(Supp.1991), requiring that "reasonable 
proof" of loss of income be produced requisite to any PIP 
benefits being paid, this Court added: 
[I]t is also pertinent to observe that the 
general rule is that an award of damages cannot 
properly be made on mere possibility or conjecture, 
there must be a firmer foundation. That is, any 
such award must be supported by proof upon which 
reasonable minds acting fairly thereon, could 
believe that it is more probable than not, that 
damage was actually suffered. 
Id. at 961-962 (footnote omitted). 
Applying herein this Court's analyses and holding in 
Jamison that (1) proof of damages meriting PIP benefits must be 
made upon firm foundation (2) losses must actually be suffered 
before PIP benefits are appropriate bases for recovery; and (3) 
had the legislature intended to provide for the relief plaintiff 
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seeks it could have so stated2, compel the conclusion that 
section 31A-22-307 must likewise be read to require reasonable 
proof of both actual loss of income and loss of earning capacity 
before recovery is appropriate thereunder• Either element alone 
constitutes a necessary but insufficient condition for the 
payment of PIP benefits, which, if paid out as plaintiff urges, 
would negate the sensible and evenhanded purpose of the 
legislation while allowing for unrealistic and fanciful claims 
based upon "mere possibility or conjecture"< Jamison, 559 P.2d 
at 961-62. 
Application of the Jamison principles to the facts of the 
instant case also demonstrates the reasonableness of the 
legislative scheme and the correctness of the trial court's 
decision below* Here, the facts to which plaintiff stipulated 
compelled the conclusion that plaintiff had no reasonable proof 
of loss of actual income. As noted above, her claim of loss of 
earning capacity was also tentative at best. Thus, it was 
1
 Had the legislature intended that an unemployed claimant 
could recover benefits under Utah Code Ann. 3lA-22-307(l)(b)(i) 
by merely showing only a loss of earning capacity without also 
showing a loss of income, it would have expressly so provided as 
have other states. See, e.g. Marryshow v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. 
Co. , 452 A.2d 530 (Pa. Super. 1982). (statute provided for 
benefits for victims who were not employed when accident 
resulting in injury occurred); Morgan v. State Farm Mutual Auto 
Ins. Co., 613 P.2d 684 (Kansas Ct. App. 1980) (applying statutory 
scheme explicitly addressing unemployed persons). 
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questionable whether plaintiff met either of the conditions 
required for PIP benefits, let alone both criterion. 
Nevertheless, plaintiff implicitly attempted to argue 
that since she had begun to search for a job after years of 
unemployment and since she had worked for two days after the 
accident that somehow she should receive benefits for that work 
which she would have theoretically done had she not been injured. 
As noted above, the statutory scheme does not provide for such 
eventualities and for an "automatic reward" or a 'windfall' for 
being involved in an accident" when there is no loss actually 
suffered. See id. The statutory scheme further requires 
reasonable proof of loss, of which none has been provided. See, 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(5) . The general rule of damages is 
that the plaintiff must provide proof of damage; damages cannot 
be based upon possibility or conjecture. 
Accordingly, since plaintiff provided no reasonable proof 
to show actual loss of gross income the trial court correctly 
ruled that she could not recover any benefits under the 
applicable statute 3 and its order should be affirmed on appeal. 
J
 The cases are distinguishable that appellant cites in 
support of her claim. See e.g. Marrvshow v. Nationwide Mutual 
Ins. Co., 452 A.2d 530 (Pa. Super. 1982); Minier v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. , 454 A.2d 1078 (Pa. Super. 1982). 
(statute provided for benefits for victims who were not employed 
when accident resulting in injury occurred). 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly ruled that summary judgment was 
appropriate in this case inasmuch as plaintiff failed to comply 
with the no-fault statutory requirement that a reasonable showing 
of loss of income must be made requisite to obtaining any 
disability benefits and since plaintiff failed to otherwise 
demonstrate a loss of earning capacity as required by law. The 
trial court's conclusion should be affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this (4 day of March, 1991. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
THEODORE E." KANELlT^ f\ 
JARYL L. RENCHER W 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
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JUL i ? m 
THEODORE E. KANELL (1768) 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorney for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLENDA VERSLUIS, * ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENTS 
* 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. * 
GUARANTY NATIONAL COMPANIES, * Judge Pat B. Brian 
* Civil No.: 900900964PI 
Defendant. * 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
pursuant to the joint request of both parties for oral arguments 
on the cross-motions for summary judgment on the 2"2nd" day of" 
June, 1990, at 8:30 a.m. before the Honorable Judge Pat B. Brian. 
Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel of record, Robert B. 
Breeze and Defendant appeared by and through counsel of record, 
Theodore E. Kanell. The Court after reviewing all memoranda, 
pleadings and depositions, heard arguments of counsel. The Court 
after being fully apprised in the premises and after hearing all 
that was presented by the parties denied Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and granted the Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Court based its' rulings on the following findings: 
1. Plaintiff was not employed at the time of the 
accident• 
2. Plaintiff had not been employed for a period of 
thirteen months before the accident* 
3 • Plaintiff presented no provable evidence that she 
had eminent employment, including the following: 
a. No evidence of a job offer; and 
b. No evidence of hours that she would work; and 
c. No evidence of wages that she would be 
receiving while working; and 
d. No detailed specific evidence that she was 
seeking employment. 
4. The Court concluded as a matter of law that pursuant 
to the statute 31A-22-307, U-C.A. that Plaintiff must prove 
actual lost wages and loss of earning capacity. The Court 
further found that the two prong requirement of the statute had 
not been met by the Plaintiff. The Court did acknowledge that 
Plaintiff had submitted tax records and income records for 
periods in her life when she was working, but that none of the 
income periods included any time within the thirteen months 
before the accident. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby denies 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and grants Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, each party to bear their own costs 
and attorney's fees. 
DATED THIS / 7 day of _ ^/^, J?^/ , 1990. 
HONORABLE PAT B. ^ BR-IAJT 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approval as to Form: 
^2: 7-Yj5-^ 
ROBERT B. BREEZE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
<AttC / torney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the &/ -£. day of June, 
1990, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mr. Robert Breeze 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
211 East 300 South, #215 
Salt Lakfe City, Utah 84111 
EXHIBIT "B" 
APPENDIX "A" 
31-41-2 INSURANCE 
elude: Colorado, Connecticut, Dc lawn re, Law Beviews. 
Florida, Georgia. Hawaii, Kansas, Ken- Xo-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah 
tueky, Maryland. Massachusetts, Michigan, —State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah 
Minnesota, Xcvada, Xew Jersey, New LO Rex. 248. 
York. Orrcon. Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico Compensation Systems and Utah's No-
and South Carolina. p a u j t Statute, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 383. 
Countrywide Overview of Automobile 
No-Fault" Insurance, 23 Defense L. J. 443 
Safety Responsibility Act. 14-12-1 ct (1974). 
Cross-Reference. 
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31-41-2. Purpose of act—Property damage claims not affected.—The 
purpose of this act is to require the payment of certain prescribed benefits 
in respect to motor vehicle accidents through either insurance or other 
approved security but on the basis of no faul t preserving, however, the 
right of an injured person to pursue the customary tort claims where the 
most serious types of injuries occur. The intention of the legislature is 
hereby to possibly stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings in, the rising 
costs of automobile accident insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, 
equitable method of handling the greater bulk of the personal injury 
claims that arise out of automobile accidents, these being those not involv-
ing great amounts of damages. This act is not designed to have any effect 
on property damage claims. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 2. Scfe Am. Jur. 2d. No-Fault Insurance 
_
 mm m _ §§ 1-34, when published. CoUateral References. ** 
Insurance€=H.l. Validity and construction of "no-fault" 
44 CJT.S. Insurance § 64. automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. R. 3d 
229. 
31-41-3. Definition of terms.—As used in this act : 
(1) "Motor vehicle" means any vehicle of a kind required to be 
registered under Title 41, but excluding, however motorcycles. 
(2) "Person'* includes every natural person, firm, partnership, associa-
tion, corporation, or any governmental entity, or agency of it. 
(3) "Owner*" means a person who holds the legal title to a motor 
vehicle, or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of a security agree-
ment or lease with option to purchase with the debtor or lessee having the 
right to possession, then the debtor or lessee shall be deemed the owner for 
purposes of this act. 
(4) "Insured" means the named insured, the spouse or other relative 
of the named insured who reside in the same household as the named in-
sured, including those who usually make their home in the same household 
but temporarily live elsewhere, or any person using the described motor 
vehicle with the permission, either expressed or implied, of the owner. 
(5) "Occupying" means being in or upon a motor vehicle as a pas-
senger or operator or engaged in the immediate acts of entering, boarding, 
or alighting from a motor vehicle. 
(6) "Pedestrian" means any natural person not occupying or riding 
upon a motor vehicle. 
(7) "Department" means the Utah insurance department. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 3. 
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31-41-6 INSURANCE 
31-41-6. Minimum benefits —* Determination of reasonable value of 
medical expenses—Medical expenses include nonmedical remedial caxe and 
treatment in accordance with religious method—Deductible amounts aL 
lowed.—(1) Every insurance policy or other security complying with the 
requirements of subsection (1) of section 31-41-5 shall provide personal 
injury protection providing for payments to the insured and to all other 
persons suffering personal injury arising out of an accident involving any 
motor vehicle, except as otherwise provided in this act, in at least the 
following minimum amounts: 
fa) Medical benefits: the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary 
medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, and rehabilitation services, including 
prosthetic devices, necessary ambulance, hospital, and nursing services 
not to exceed a total of $2,000 per person, as determined under subsection 
(2) of this section. 
(b) Disability benefits: (i) 85% of any loss of gross income and loss 
of earning capacity per person from inability to work during a period 
commencing not later than three days after the date of the injury and con-
tinuing for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks thereafter, not to exceed a 
total of $150 per week, but if the person's inability to work shall so con-
tinue for in excess of a total of two consecutive weeks after the date of 
the injury, this three-day elimination period shall not be applicable; and 
fii) in lieu of reimbursement for expenses which would have been reason-
ably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the injured person 
would have performed for his household and regardless of whether any 
of these expenses are actually incurred, an allowance of $12 per day 
commencing not later than three days after the date of the injury and 
continuing for a maximum of 365 days thereafter, but if the person's in-
ability to perform these services shall so continue for in excess of a total 
of fourteen days after the date of the injury, this three-day elimination 
period shall #ot be applicable. 
(c) Funeral benefits: funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to 
exceed a total of $1,000 per person. 
(d) Survivor benefits*: compensation on account of death of a person, 
payable to his heirs, in the total of $2,000. 
(2) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses pro-
vided for in subsection (1) of this section and in subsection (1) (e) of 
section 31-41-9, the department shall conduct a relative value study of 
services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or rehabili-
tation of an injured person in the most populous county in the state for 
the purpose of assigning: a unit value and median charge to each type of 
service and accommodation. In conducting the study, the department 
shall consult with appropriate public and private medical and health 
agencies. Upon completion of the study, the department shall prepare and 
publish a relative value study which sets forth the unit value and median 
charge assigned to each type of service and accommodation. The value of 
any service or accommodation shall be determined by applying the unit 
value and median charge assigned to the service or accommodation under 
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the relative value study. If a service or accommodation is not assigned a 
unit value or median charge under the relative value study, the value of 
the service or accommodation shall equal the reasonable cost of the same 
«>r similar service or accommodation in the most populous county of this 
state. Nothing herein shall preclude the department from adopting a sched-
ule already established if it meets the requirement of this subsection. In 
deputed cases, a court on its own motion or the motion of either party 
may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than three licensed 
physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the issue of the reason-
able value of their medical expenses. 
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in subsection (1) of this section 
and in subsection (1) (e) of section 31-41-9 shall include expenses for any 
nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with a 
recognized religious method of healing. 
(4) At appropriately reduced premium rates insurers may offer de-
ductibles in amounts not exceeding $500 per accident in respect to the 
• nsurance coverages required by this act applicable, however, only to 
••aims of the insured. 
[o) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prohibit an 
insurance policy from providing coverage for any nonmedical remedial 
treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of 
healing. , 
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 6. 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 298, Automobile Insur-CoUateral Eeferences.
 a n c e § ^ 
lnsuranceC=»ll.l. | 
31-41-7. Personal injuries covered—Primary coverage—Reduction of 
benefits.—(1) The coverages described in section 31-41-6 shall be ap-
plicable to-. 
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the insured when injured in an 
accident in this state involving any motor vehicle. 
(b) Personal injuries arising out of automobile accidents occurring 
in this state sustained by any other natural person while occupying the 
described motor vehicle with the consent of the insured or while a pedes-
trian if injured in an accident involving the described motor vehicle. 
(2) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other 
policy, including those complying with this act, primary coverage shall 
:v afforded by the policy insuring the motor vehicle out of the use of 
which the accident arose. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under section 31-41-6 
^liall be reduced by: 
(a) Any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
as a result of an accident covered in this act under any workmen's com-
pensation plan or any similar statutory plan; and 
(b) Any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because of military enlist-
ment, duty or service. 
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History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 7. 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64. 
7 Am. Jur« 2d 298, Automobile Insur~ CoUateral References*
 a n c e § ge 
Insurance^»ll.L 
31-41-8. Payment of benefits—Time limit—Action for overdue beneflti 
and interest.—Payment of the benefits provided for in section 31-41-6 shall 
be made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any 
period are overdue if not paid within 35 days after the insurer receives 
reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the 
period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the 
amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 35 
days after such proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all of the 
remainder of the claim that is later supported by reasonable proof is also 
overdue if not paid within 35 days after such proof is received by the 
insurer. In the event the insurer fails to pay such expenses when due, the 
amount of these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of 1^4% per month 
after the due date, and the person entitled to such benefits may bring an 
action in contract to recover these expenses plus the applicable interest. 
If the insurer is required by such action to pay any overdue benefits and 
interest, the insurer shall also be required to pay reasonable attorney's 
fees to the claimant. 
History: L. 1973, CIL 55, § 8. 46 GJ.S. Insurance § 1407. 
44 Am. Jur. 2d 718, Insurance § 1798. CoUateral References, 
Insurance©»675. 
31-41-9. Limitations on tort actions—Liability of non-covered owner.— 
(1) No person for whom direct benefit coverage is provided for in this 
act shall be allowed to maintain a cause of action for general damages 
arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an auto-
mobile accident except where there has been caused by this accident any 
one or more of the following: 
(a) Death; 
(b) Dismemberment or fracture; 
(c) Permanent disability; 
(d) Permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) Medical expenses to a person in excess of $500. 
(2) The owner of a motor vehicle with respect to %vhich security is 
required by this act who fails to have such security in effect at the time 
of an accident shall have no immunity from tort liability and shall be 
personally liable for the payment of the benefits provided for under section 
31-41-6. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 9. automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. B. 
3d 229. CoUateral References. 
InsuranceC=>4.,l. L * w Baviews. 
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64. No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah 
See Am. Jur. 2d, No-Fault Insurance —State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah 
§§ 1-34, when published. L. Rev. 248. 
. Countrywide Overview of Automobile 
Validity and construction of "no-fault" No-Fault Insurance, 23 Defense L. J. 443 
(1974). 
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